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Abstract 
In this paper, we consider the licensing behavior from an upstream firm to a 
vertically-integrated firm. We find that the optimal contract includes only a 
per-unit royalty rate when the innovation is small. Moreover, the royalty rate may 
be even larger than the innovation level. Under such a circumstance, the 
competing firms can achieve a collusive outcome through technology licensing; 
however, the social welfare improves. Furthermore, if the upstream firm 
determines the input price while dealing the licensing contract with the 
vertically-integrated firm, the upstream firm licenses to the vertically-integrated 
firm by a fixed-fee and determines a high input price to deter other downstream 
firms from entry. That may distort the social welfare. 
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1 Introduction 
In the last two decades, technology licensing has been a common business 
behavior and grown substantially. Nadiri (1993) shows that the international payments 
for technology have an amazing growth. For Japan and U.K. the total transaction 
between 1970 to 1988 increased by about 400%, France and the U.S. experienced an 
increase of about 550% while West Germany had a spectacular increase of over 
1000% between 1979 and 1988. As the importance of intellectual property right to be 
recognized nowadays, technology licensing itself sometimes even becomes a strategic 
tool. It can be used as a tool to deter the rival firm from entry (eg., Gallini (1984)) or 
to do the R&D (eg., Gallini and Winter (1985)). The discussion in the literature is also 
flourishing. 
In the development of literature in technology licensing, the issue of optimal 
contract has been largely discussed. Rostocker (1984) finds that royalty alone is used 
39% of the time, fixed fee alone is 13%, and both instruments together are 46%, and 
the percentage seems not changed largely. Numerous studies have been devoted to 
explain this result. Depends on whether the innovator is the inside competitor or 
outside independent firm, the discussion in the literature has two main branches, and 
the optimal contract form may change accordingly. Given the innovator is also an 
inside competitor, Wang (1998) shows that the optimal contract is the royalty 
licensing. Moreover, if there is an upstream input monopolist in the market and the 
technology licensing is among the downstream firms, Arya and Mittendorf (2006) 
show that the optimal contract is also the royalty licensing. On the other hand, 
Kamien and Tauman (1986) show that if the innovator is an outsider, the optimal 
contract is the fixed-fee licensing. However, when there is an input monopolist in the 
industry, the optimal contract of the outside innovator is the royalty licensing.  
The intuition of the above papers goes as follows: The merit of fixed-fee 
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licensing is it lowers the industry cost, and the innovator exploits the extra rents 
coming from the lowered industry cost. However, if there are too many firms licensed 
under fixed fee licensing, the profit of the innovator lowers owing to the too intense 
competition among the licensees. On the other hand, royalty licensing controls the 
level of competition among the licensees since the output of the downstream firms 
does not increase as much as that under fixed-fee licensing. Therefore, if the innovator 
is also the competitor in the market, he prefers the royalty licensing; otherwise, the 
fixed-fee licensing. If there is an input monopolist in the industry, whether the 
innovator is an insider or outsider, he prefers the royalty licensing. The intuition is 
that fixed-fee licensing lowers the industry cost and therefore increases the final 
outputs. That in turn results in a higher derived demand of input. Under such a 
circumstance, the input monopolist would charges the downstream firms a higher 
input prices and exploits part of the benefits coming from technology licensing. 
Besides the above papers, there are still many articles discussing the optimal 
licensing contract. Given the patentee is an outside innovator, Kamien and Tauman 
(1984), Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986) find the similar results as Kamien and Tauman 
(1986) that license by means of a fixed fee or auction is superior to royalty for both 
the innovator and the consumers. Moreover, Kamien et al. (1992) extend theses 
results to non-linear demand function. On the other hand, given the patentee is also an 
inside competitor, Wang (2002) extends the results in Wang (1998) to a differentiated 
Cournot model, he finds that royalty licensing prefers to fixed-fee licensing if and 
only if the products are not too differentiated; moreover, the innovator may even 
license a drastic innovation by means of royalty when the goods are imperfect 
substitutes. Faulí-Oller and Sandonís (2002) have the similar result as Wang (2002). 
Wang and Yang (1999) show that this finding also holds if the firms compete in 
Bertrand fashion as long as their products are not too differentiated. Kamien and 
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Tauman (2002) synthesize the two branches.  
Sen (2005) starts from another point of view to explain why royalty licensing 
could be superior to both fixed fee and auction, that is, the number of licenses can 
take only integer values. Therefore, the innovator’s profit under fixed fee licensing or 
auction is a step function, it is possible for royalty licensing to be a better licensing 
method. Bousquet et al. (1998) studies the design of the licensing contracts under 
demand or cost uncertainty, and find that the optimal contract consists of, in general, a 
mix of a fixed fee and royalties. Poddar and Shinha (2004) use a linear city model to 
investigate the optimal licensing strategy for an outsider patentee and an insider 
patentee. Under the assumption of Bertrand competition, they find that royalty 
licensing is the optimal licensing contract for an outside patentee. Moreover, when the 
innovator is also an inside competitor, royalty licensing is superior to fixed-fee 
licensing when the innovation is non-drastic; however, no licensing is the optimal 
strategy when the innovation is drastic. Poddar and Shinha (2010) consider the case in 
which technology licensing happens from a cost-inefficient firm to a cost-efficient 
firm. They show that the optimal licensing contract includes a positive royalty rate 
when the innovation is drastic or the cost difference between the firms is moderate. 
As the production chain now is more and more complex, the behavior of 
technology licensing is also more and more complicated. As we show above, the 
market structure plays an important role. If there are upstream firms in the market, the 
optimal licensing strategy may be different. However, in the literature of technology 
licensing, the licensing happens only among the pure downstream firms. In the real 
world, the market may not only consist of pure downstream firms or upstream firms. 
There are also vertically-integrated firms, such as Apple, Samsung, and so on. The 
possibility that technology licensing happens from a pure upstream (downstream) firm 
to vertically-integrated firm is neglected, and vice versa. For example, Silicon Image, 
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the leading company in Serial ATA, provides its chip set to MSI, GIGABYTE, and so 
on, and reaches a licensing agreement in Serial ATA chip set with Samsung. In this 
case, the technology licensing happens from the upstream firm, Silicon Image, to the 
vertically-integrated firm, Samsung. It is hardly to define whether Silicon Image is the 
inside innovator or outside innovator. The intuition that we discussed above cannot be 
directly applied. Therefore, we would like to complete the blank in the literature of 
technology licensing. 
Moreover, we would like to discuss an interesting issue which is also neglected in 
the literature of technology licensing. All of the literature assumes the technology 
licensing is a rather long-term contract than the decision making of input price and 
should be considered in prior of the determination of input price. However, given the 
technology licensing is from the upstream firm to the vertically-integrated firm, the 
upstream firm has the option to decide the licensing mode and the input price at the 
same time. I would like to examine whether the setup of game structure matters. We 
introduce our model setup in section 2, followed up the equilibrium if the upstream 
firm makes the decision of licensing mode and the input price sequentially. Then we 
derive the equilibrium that the upstream firm makes the decision of licensing mode 
and the input price simultaneously in section 3. Section 4 compares the equilibriums 
to see whether there are differences if the upstream firm can make his decision 
sequentially or simultaneously. Section 5 concludes this paper.  
 
2 Model Setup 
This paper aims to analysis the issue of technology licensing from an upstream 
firm to a vertically-integrated firm. We assume the upstream firm, firm U, sells the 
intermediate goods to the downstream firm, firm D, with input price w. Moreover, 
there is a vertically-integrated firm, firm I, which produces the intermediate good by 
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itself and competes with firm D in the final good market. However, we assume firm U 
has the more advanced technology than firm I in producing the intermediate good. 
With this advanced technology, the vertically-integrated firm can lower the marginal 
production cost in intermediate good from c to c ε− . For simplicity, I assume one 
unit of input to produce one unit of output. The market demand of the final good is 
defined as ( )P Q a Q= − , where Q is the output. Furthermore, I assume the upstream 
firm has all the bargaining power in the licensing game and the contract form is of 
two-part tariff, that is, a per-unit royalty rate and a fixed payment. As shown in Sen 
and Tauman (2007), if the two-part tariff contract includes only a royalty rate, then the 
royalty licensing necessarily generates more revenues for innovator than fixed-fee 
licensing. On the other hand, if the two-part tariff contract includes only a fixed-fee 
payment, then the fixed-fee licensing creates higher profits for the innovator than 
royalty licensing. However, we do not exclude the possibility that the optimal contract 
includes both royalty rate and fixed-fee. 
 
2.1 Basic Model: No Technology Licensing 
The game structure for the basic model is as follows: In the first stage, the 
upstream firm determines the input price. Then, in the second stage, firm D and firm I 
compete in Cournot fashion in the final good market. We look for the subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium and solve it by backward induction.  
The profit of the downstream firm and the vertically-integrated firm are as 
follows: 
[ ]( )D DP Q w qπ = − ,            (1) 
[ ]( )I IP Q c qπ = − ,            (2) 
where the subscript “D” and “I” denote the variables associated with downstream firm 
  5 
and vertically-integrated firm, and D IQ q q= + . For simplicity, we assume the 
marginal cost in producing the final goods is zero. Differentiating (1) and (2) with 
respect to Dq  and Iq  respectively, we can have the first-order conditions. By 
solving the first-order conditions simultaneously, the equilibrium outputs in the final 
stage are as follows: 
 2
3D
a w cq − +=  and 2
3I
a w cq + −= .        (3) 
In the first stage, the upstream firm determines the optimal input price. The profit 
function of the upstream firm is as follows: 
 ( )U w c xπ ε= − + ,            (4) 
where Dx q=  as we assume one unit of input to produce one unit of output, and the 
subscript “U” denotes the variables associated with the upstream firm. Differentiating 
(4) with respect to w, we have the first-order condition of the upstream firm. The 
equilibrium input price is therefore as follows: 
 3 2
4
N a cw ε+ −= ,            (5) 
the superscript “N” denotes the equilibrium that there is no technology licensing. 
Substituting (5) into (3), we can have the equilibrium final output as follows: 
 2
6
N
D
a cq ε− +=  and 5 5 2
12
N
I
a cq ε− −= ,       (6) 
where 0NIq >  if 0 5( ) / 2a cε< < − . Moreover, substituting (5) and (6) into (1), (2) 
and (4), we have the equilibrium profits of the competing firms as follows: 
 
2( 2 )
24
N
U
a c επ − += , 
2( 2 )
36
N
D
a c επ − += , and 
2(5 5 2 )
144
N
I
a c επ − −= . 
The social welfare which consists of all the producer surpluses and the consumer 
surplus is as follows: 
 2 21 119( ) 68( ) 92
288
NSW a c a c ε ε = − + − +  . 
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2.2 The Equilibriums under Technology Licensing 
In this sub-section, we would like to discuss the issue of technology licensing from an 
upstream firm to a vertically-integrated firm. The game structure is as follows: In the 
first stage, the upstream firm offers a take-or-leave-it licensing contract to the 
vertically-integrated firm. With this advanced technology, the vertically-integrated 
firm can lower the marginal cost in producing the inputs by ε . The upstream firm 
charges the vertically-integrated firm a per-unit royalty rate and a fixed-fee. In the 
second stage, the upstream firm determines the optimal input price. In the final stage, 
the downstream firm and the vertically-integrated firm compete in Cournot fashion. 
Again, we use backward induction to derive the sub-game perfect equilibrium. The 
profit function of the downstream firm and the vertically-integrated firm are as 
follows: 
 [ ]( )D DP Q w qπ = − ,           (7) 
 [ ]( )I I IF P Q c r q Fπ εΠ ≡ − = − + − − ,       (8) 
where r is the per-unit royalty and F is the fixed-fee. Differentiating (7) and (8) with 
respect to qD and qI, we can derive the first-order conditions. By solving these 
first-order conditions simultaneously, the equilibrium outputs in the final stage are as 
follows: 
 2
3D
a w c rq ε− + − +=  and 2( )
3I
a w c rq ε+ − − += .     (9) 
From the one-to-one input-output transformation, we have Dx q= . The profit 
function of the upstream firm is as follow: 
 ( )U U I Irq F w c x rq Fπ εΠ ≡ + + = − + + + .       (10) 
In this stage, the upstream firm determines the input price, by differentiating (10) with 
respect to w, we can have the first-order condition. The optimal input price is as 
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follows: 
 3 3 2
4
a c rw ε+ − += .           (11) 
The comparative statics of w with respect to r is positive. It is intuitive since the 
higher the royalty rate, the higher the marginal cost of the vertically-related firm and 
thus a larger output of the downstream firm which results in a higher derived demand 
of input. By substituting (11) into (9), the final output in the second stage are as 
follows: 
 
6D
a cq ε− +=  and 5( )
12 2I
a c rq ε− += − .       (12) 
The equilibrium profits of the competing firms in the second stage are as follows: 
 
2 2( ) 12( ) 12
24U
a c a c r r Fε ε− + + − + −Π = + ,  
2( )
36D
a c επ − += , and [ ]
25( ) 6
144I
a c r
F
ε− + −
Π = − . 
In the first stage, the upstream firm determines the optimal contract. The profit 
maximization of the upstream monopolist is as follows: 
 max Ur Π  subject to 
N
U UπΠ ≥  and 
N
I IπΠ ≥ . 
In other words, ( )N NU U I I Irq Fπ π π π− + ≤ ≤ − . It should be noted that technology 
licensing holds if and only if ( )N NU I I U Irqπ π π π+ ≤ + + . Since we assume the 
upstream monopolist has the full bargaining power, the fixed-fee is as follows: 
 ( )( )10 10 3 6 7 6 0
144
N
I I
a c r r
F
ε ε
π π
− + − −
= − = ≥ . 
The maximization problem of the upstream firm can be rewrite as follows: 
 max NU I I Ir rqπ π π+ + − . 
The optimal royalty rate is as follows: 
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 3
7
6 6
6 6
s
a c
r if
a c a c
ε ε
ε ε
− ≤=  − + − >

, 
where the superscript “3s” denotes the equilibrium under the three-stage technology 
licensing game, that is, the upstream firm makes the decision of optimal contract and 
the input price sequentially. We make this result as the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1. When the innovation is relatively small, the optimal contract consists 
of royalty rate only, and the royalty rate is even larger than the innovation level. 
When the innovation is large, the optimal contract consists of both royalty rate and 
fixed-fee. 
 
It should be noted that since we assume the upstream firm has all the bargaining 
power and the licensing contract is of two-part tariff, the upstream firm exactly is the 
“pass through” competitor in the final market. The upstream firm would like to 
achieve a collusive outcome by manipulating the royalty rate. When the innovation is 
small, the profits coming from the technology licensing is relatively less important, 
therefore, the upstream firm would like to control the level of competition by charging 
r ε> . In such a circumstance, the total output of final good is larger than that under 
monopoly, and the vertically-integrated firm is also willing to accept this offer since 
the final good market now is more collusive. When the innovation is large, the profits 
coming from the technology licensing is more important, the upstream firm would 
decrease the royalty rate and control the output of final good at the level of monopoly. 
 
The equilibrium input price and the final output are as follows: 
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3
3 9 2
612
2 2
3 6
s
a ca c
w if
a c a c
ε ε
ε
ε
−+ − ≤=  + − − >

,  
3
5 5 2
612
3 6
s
I
a ca c
q if
a c a c
ε ε
ε
ε
−− − ≤=  − + − >

,  3
6
S
D
a cq ε− += .    (13) 
The equilibrium profits are as follows: 
2 2
3
2 2
3( ) 48( ) 4
72 6
7 ( ) 12( ) 4
6144
s
U
a c a c a c
if
a ca c a c
ε ε
ε
ε ε ε
 − + − − −
≤Π =  − − + − +   >

, 
2
3 (5 5 2 )
144
s
I
a c ε− −
Π = , and 
2
3 ( )
36
s
D
a c επ − += . 
Moreover, the social welfare is as follows: 
 3
2
7( )(17 17 24 )
288 6
3( )
68
s
a c a c a c
SW if
a ca c
ε
ε
ε ε
− − + −
≤=  −− + >

. 
From (13), we can have the equilibrium of the total output of final good as follows: 
 3
7( )
612
2 6
s
a ca c
Q if
a c a c
ε
ε ε
−− ≤=  − + − >

, 
As we stated above, the upstream firm uses the royalty rate to control the level of 
competition. When the innovation is large, the total output of final good is the same as 
that under monopoly. Moreover, subtract SWN from SW3s, the social welfare after 
technology licensing still improves owing to the cost reduction is prominent. We 
make this result as the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2. The competing firms may achieve a collusive outcome through 
technology licensing. However, the social welfare still improves. 
  10 
 
3 Simultaneous Decision Making on the Input Price and the Optimal Contract 
Most of the literature of technology licensing assumes the decision making of 
licensing contract is in prior to the determination of input price since the licensing 
contract is a long-term decision. It should be noted that since the decision maker of 
the optimal contract and the input price is the upstream firm, it is reasonable to guess 
the upstream firm can determine them at the same time if dosing so is more profitable. 
Therefore, in this section, we assume the upstream firm determines the optimal 
licensing contract and the input price in the first stage. Then the downstream firm and 
vertically-integrated firm compete in Cournot fashion in the second stage. We use 
backward induction to solve the subgame perfect equilibrium for the two-stage game. 
 The equilibrium of the final stage is the same as that in the three-stage game and 
is specified as (9). Therefore, the profit maximization problem of the upstream firm in 
the first stage is as follows: 
,
max ( )U U I Iw r rq F w c x rq Fπ εΠ ≡ + + = − + + +  s.t. 
N
U UπΠ ≥  and 
N
I IπΠ ≥ .  
Again, as we assume the upstream firm has all the bargaining power, the fixed-fee is 
0NI IF π= Π − ≥ . The first-order conditions are as follows: 
 ( 2 4 ) 0
9
U a w c r
r
ε∂Π − + − + −
= =
∂
, 
(5 10 5 5 2 ) 0
3
U a w c r
w
ε∂Π − + − +
= =
∂
, 
By solving the first-order conditions simultaneously, the optimal input price and 
royalty rate are as follows: 
 2 ( )
2
s a cw ε+ −=  and 2 0sr = , 
where the superscript “2s” denotes the equilibrium under the two-stage technology 
licensing game. The equilibrium outputs of the competing firms are as follows:  
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 2 0sDq =  and 
2 ( )
2
s
I
a cq ε− += . 
The equilibrium profits are as follows: 
2 0sDπ = , 
2
2 (5 5 2 )
144
s
I
a c ε− −
Π = , and 
2 2
2 ( ) (5 5 2 )
4 144
s
U
a c a cε ε− + − −
Π = − . 
From above, we can have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3. If the upstream firm determines the optimal contract and the input 
price simultaneously, the upstream firm licenses to the vertically-integrated firm by 
fixed-fee and determines a high input price to deter the downstream firm from 
entry. 
 
Again, since we assume the licensing contract consists of a per-unit royalty and a 
fixed-fee. The profits of the upstream firm coming from two parts, one is the 
competing profit from the downstream firm, and the other is the licensing revenue. 
Now, in this game structure, the upstream firm has two tools to do the profit 
maximization. Therefore, the upstream firm deters the downstream firm from entry 
and license to the vertically-integrated firm by fixed-fee only. In such a circumstance, 
the upstream firm exactly is the “pass through” monopolist and generates the highest 
industry profit. 
 
The social welfare is as follows: 
 
2
2 3( )
8
s a cSW ε− += . 
2 0s NSW SW− ≤  if 0 ( 37 3 157)( ) / 8a cε< ≤ − + − . Accordingly, we can have the 
following proposition. 
 
  12 
Proposition 4. If the upstream firm determines the input price and the optimal 
contract simultaneously, technology licensing lowers social welfare when the 
innovation is relatively small. 
 
The intuition is as follows. When the innovation is small, the distortion owing to the 
“pass-through” monopoly outweighs the welfare improvement from the cost-reducing, 
therefore, the social welfare decreases. Only when the innovation is large, the effect 
of cost-reducing dominates. 
 
4 The Comparison of the Equilibriums between Sequential and Simultaneous 
Game 
We are interested in whether the upstream firm would determine the input price and 
the optimal contract simultaneously, that is, whether the upstream firm generates a 
higher profit under the simultaneous game. By a direct comparison, we can find that 
3 2s s
U UΠ ≤ Π . We make this result as the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 5. The upstream firm enjoys a higher profit if he determines the optimal 
contract and input price simultaneously. 
  
The intuition is as follows. Under the scheme of three-stage game, the input price is 
also a function of royalty rate, and the upstream firm enjoys a higher profit if the final 
good market is more collusive. Since the two-part tariff licensing contract is a kind of 
“pass-through” monopoly, the upstream firm can manipulate the level of competition 
by adjusting royalty rate. However, in determining the optimal contract, the upstream 
firm can only use royalty rate to balance the competing profits and the licensing 
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revenue. If the upstream firm raises the royalty rate to reduce the output of the 
vertically-integrated firm and soften the competition, that in turn will makes the 
independent downstream firm to produce more and decreases the licensing revenue. 
Therefore, these two contrary effects make the upstream firm less capable to soften 
the competition in the final good market. Moreover, in the sequential game, the 
upstream firm can not deter the independent downstream firm from entry since the 
commitment is not credible. In the three-stage game, only if the royalty rate is high, 
otherwise, the vertically-integrated firm would not believe the upstream firm will 
charge the independent firm a high input price. However, in the simultaneous game, 
since the decision making of the royalty rate and input price are in the same stage, the 
vertically-integrated firm would believe the upstream firm will charge a high input 
price and deter the independent downstream firm from entry. 
 
5 Conclusion 
We use a simple model to investigate the licensing behavior from an upstream 
firm to a vertically-integrated firm and find that: If the upstream firm determines the 
optimal contract and the input price sequentially, the upstream firm can soften the 
market competition by adjusting the royalty rate and achieve a more collusive 
outcome; however, the social welfare still improves. On the other habd, if the 
upstream firm determines the input price while dealing the licensing contract with the 
vertically-integrated firm, the upstream firm licenses to the vertically-integrated firm 
by a fixed-fee and determines a high input price to deter other downstream firms from 
entry. That may distort the social welfare. 
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